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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

Case No.

v.
Category No. 14

DAN A. PARK,
Defendant-Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole question presented in this petition is whether
the court of appeals properly interpreted and applied this
Court's decision in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in
holding that defendant's consent to search was "invalid" and,
therefore, that the evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to
his consent was not admissible?
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is
State v. Park, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Utah Ct. App. April 10,
1991), a copy of which is contained in the addendum to this
petition.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On April 10, 1991, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its
decision reversing the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
to suppress.

The state timely filed requests for a stay of

remittitur with the court of appeals and for an extension of time

in which to file this petition with the supreme court.

Both

requests were granted.
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990) and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of any constitutional, statutory or rule
provisions pertinent to the issue presented for review is
contained in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Dan A. Park, was charged on May 10, 1989,
with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent
to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1990) and possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990) (R.
5).
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the
contraband seized from his vehicle pursuant to a warrantless
search conducted contemporaneously with a roadblock stop (R. 2526).

The evidentiary hearing established that defendant was

stopped, along with numerous other vehicles, at a roadblock set
up by the Utah Highway Patrol for the purpose of detecting
driver's license, automobile registration, and equipment
violations (R. 149-51).

After being stopped at the roadblock,

defendant consented to a search of his vehicle, which search
-2-

revealed five baggies of marijuana and a small amount of
methamphetamine (R. 141, 143-44, 187, 217, 220-24, 230, 257 269,
277 J.1

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, ruling

that the roadblock met federal constitutional standards and that
defendant had voluntarily consented to the search (R. 49-56).
Subsequently, defendant was convicted by jury verdict
of the lesser included offense of possession of marijuana, a
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990), and possession of methamphetamine as
charged (R. 102-03).

He was sentenced to concurrent statutory

terms of imprisonment, the execution of which was suspended, and
defendant was placed on probation under specified terms and
conditions (R. 109-11).
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed defendant's
convictions by holding that the roadblock violated the fourth
amendment of the federal constitution under Michigan Dept. of
State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), as previously
determined by the court of appeals in the related case of State
v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

It further held that

under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), defendant's
consent to the search of his vehicle was not sufficiently
attenuated from the unlawful roadblock stop to avoid the taint of
that initial illegality and, therefore, the consent was invalid.

1

The court of appeals' decision contains an accurate, though
not complete, statement of the facts in this case. However, for
purposes of this petition, only a cursory summary of the facts is
necessary.
-3-

State v. Park, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 54 (Utah Ct. App. April 10,
1991).2
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED
AND APPLIED THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE
ARROYO TEST FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF
THE CONSENT TO SEARCH.
The state does not seek review of the court of appeals'
conclusion that the roadblock in this case did not meet federal
constitutional standards.
Despite this initial illegality, the issue remains
whether the subsequent warrantless search of defendant's vehicle
was nevertheless permissible pursuant to his consent to the
search.

State v. Park, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 54 (Utah Ct. App.

April 10, 1991).

The state submits that in attempting to apply

this Court's decision in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990), the court of appeals both misapplied the test for
determining the voluntariness of a consent to search and
effectively decided an important question of law which has not,
but should be, decided by this Court.

Utah Rule of App. P. 46(b)

and (d).
As delineated in the state's petition for certiorari

2

As noted, the court of appeals considered the virtually
identical roadblock in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141(Utah Ct. App.
1991).
The state has filed a petition for certiorari in Sims,
challenging the court's determination that the roadblock did not
meet state constitutional standards and the court's application of
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
Because of the
similarity of the factual and legal issues, the state will request
that the Sims and Park cases be consolidated for purposes of
argument if the petitions for certiorari are granted.
-4-

filed in the companion case of State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991), this Court in Arroyo left open the question of
how a reviewing court should consider and balance the factors
pertinent to the exploitation prong of the two-pronged test
adopted in that case.3

For the reasons stated in the Sims

attachment, this has resulted in the court of appeals focusing
primarily on the attenuation factors of "temporal proximity" and
"intervening circumstances" without giving proper weight to the
causal connection and effect of any police misconduct on the
voluntariness of the consent.
Instead of considering "temporal proximity" and
"intervening circumstances" as simply relevant factors under the
exploitation prong of Arroyo, the court of appeals characterized
time and place as the main components of what the court referred
to as an "attenuation analysis."

State v. Park, 158 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 54 (citing State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14).A
Finding that the consent here was given shortly after the stop,
and adopting the Sims analysis that any events transpiring at the
scene of the roadblock could not be considered as "intervening
circumstances," the court concluded that defendant's consent
arose from an unbroken "chain of events" beginning with the

3

A copy of the pertinent section of the state's petition for
certiorari in State v. Sims is attached to the addendum.
4

Because the Park decision extensively cites to the Utah
Advance Reports' version of the Sims case, these internal cites
will be referred to as they were by the court of appeals, without
reference to the Pacific Reporter citation.
The Utah Advance
Reports' version of Sims is attached to the addendum.
-5-

roadblock.

Id.

But, as noted by this Court, "all evidence is [not]
fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come
to light but for the illegal actions of the police.M

State v.

Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).

Indeed, the high majority of consent

searches occur contemporaneously with a stop or detention which
may subsequently be determined unconstitutional.

To adopt the

emphasis of the court of appeals, that temporal proximity and
lack of intervening events mandate the invalidation of a consent
occurring after any illegal police misconduct, would be to allow
a per se rule of exclusion.

Just as the "distinct policies and

interests of the Fourth Amendment" encourage a rejection of a per
se rule of admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to a
consent occurring subsequent to illegal police action, the same
policies preclude the adoption of a per se or "but for" rule of
inadmissibility.

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975).

If "temporal proximity" and "intervening circumstances"
were determinative of the issue of exploitation, this Court would
not have remanded for a further evidentiary hearing in Arroyo.
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687.

Instead, applying the

reasoning of the court of appeals in Park and Sims, this Court
should have simply reversed Arroyo's conviction.

For viewing the

facts most favorable to the state, even if Arroyo had otherwise
voluntarily consented to the search after the pretext stop, the
consent would have "flowed" from the unconstitutional stop and
-6-

therefore, according to the court of appeals, would have
necessarily been invalid.

This Court rejected such a mechanical

"but for" analysis by recognizing the factual sensitivity of the
exploitation prong and the need for additional findings.
The necessity that this Court clarify the proper
application of the factors enunciated in Arroyo can further be
seen by the court of appeals' superficial consideration of the
purpose and flagrancy of the primary police illegality.

The only

mention of this factor in the Park decision is the conclusory
statement that "the purpose of the illegal police conduct did not
correct the constitutional violation."

State v. Park, 158 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 54 (citing State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14).
In Sims, the court concluded that "although it does not appear
that the officers behaved abusively toward those stopped at the
roadblock, this does not correct the constitutional violation."
Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. Not only is this an incorrect
application of the exploitation prong of Arroyo, but it
misinterprets the reasons for consideration of the nature of the
police misconduct.
The unconstitutionality of police action can never be
"corrected."

Rather, once it is determined that unconstitutional

police action preceded a search, the issue then becomes whether
the purpose of the fourth amendment would be served by
suppression of the evidence subsequently obtained in a voluntary
consent search or whether, under the facts of a given violation,
the "exclusionary rule [would impose] a greater cost on the
-7-

legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by
the rule's deterrent purposes."

State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688

(quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09 (1975)).
Further, the analysis of the purpose and flagrancy of
any police misconduct is not a separate "alternative approach" to
the "attenuation analysis."

State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at

14 (adopted in State v. Park, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14). Central
to any determination of exploitation is the issue of whether the
consent was obtained as a direct result of flagrant or purposeful
police misconduct.

State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689.

Thus, in

deciding the exploitation question, a court considers jointly the
following factors:
the temporal proximity of the consent to the
arrest, the presence or absence of
intervening circumstances, whether the police
purpose underlying the illegality was to
obtain the consent or the fruits of the
search, whether the consent was volunteered
or requested, whether the defendant was aware
he could decline to consent, and
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of
the official misconduct.
People v. Borges, 511 N.E.2d 58, 59-60 (N.Y. 1987) (cited with
approval in Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 691). For "the point at which
the taint can be said to have dissipated should be related, in
the absence of other controlling circumstances, to the nature of
that taint."

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 609 (J.Powell,

concurring).
Because the court of appeals' interpretation and
application of the exploitation prong of the Arroyo test has
broad implications governing the admissibility of evidence in

8

criminal prosecutions throughout the state, this Court should
grant r*ei:L IOJ ai i CIMH n^/iew i lie court of appeals1 holding.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and constituent with the
considerations of rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
state respectfully requests this Court to grant the petition for
w r i t o f c e r t; ;i \ ;> r a r i .

DATED this

'

(o^h

day of June, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accur ate cop} of the
foregoing petition for certiorari was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Leray G. Jackson, attorney of record for appellant,
545, Delta, Utah

4 624, tl,.. ^AJ

day of Jit mi 2, ] 991.
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Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Higley
158 Utah Adv. Rep. 49
4

CODE ©CO
Provo, Utah

the limits of its policy. The statute says that
the State's claim for recovery "shall be a lien
against any proceeds payable to the recipient
(Higley} by that third party.* (Emphasis
added.) Higley, as the recipient, had a claim
for recovery against a liable third party. He
pursued that claim without State consent, thus
the State's claim against Higley included "any
proceeds" payable by the third party to the
extent of the State medical assistance provided
to him. Camp, 779 P.2d at 246.

3. At oral Mgwntnt, tht State conceded that the
statute is not triggered when the applicant for
medical assistance has already recovered on his or
her third-party claim before the State became
obligated to provide medical assistance. At that
point, the applicant is required to report the proceeds as income or an asset on the application/
affidavit form. Then, the State would take the
amount of the recovery into account in determining
the applicant's eligibility for medical assistance. The
State has other remedies in the event the claim or
recovery is not reported:

CONCLUSION
The State became obligated to pay and did
pay medical assistance in Higley's behalf.
Higley proceeded to settle his claim against
third parties without the State's consent. The
trial court determined that Higley violated the
requirements of the statute and that the State
was entitled to recover from Higley the
medical assistance provided. Since the amount
of the assistance exceeded the amount of the
insurance proceeds, the State's recovery necessarily included all the proceeds available to
Higley under the liable parties' insurance
policy. We give no deference to the trial
court's ruling but we find no error requiring a
different result. Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Salt
Lake City-County Bd. of Health, 771 P.2d
671, 673 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). On the undisputed material facts the statute applies and is
controlling. Camp, 779 P.2d at 245.
Affirmed.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge

The department may recover medical
assistance incorrectly paid, whether due
to administrative or factual error or
fraud, from the recipient or his estate
and may, pursuant to a judgment,
impose a lien against the property of the
recipient.
Utah Code Ann. §26-19-13(5) (1989).
Civil and criminal penalties are also available to
the State for false statement or representation relating to medical benefits. See §§26-20-3,-7,-9
and-9.5.
4. The definition of "third party" includes Higley's
parents who by virtue of the parent-child relationship "may be liable to pay all or part of the
medical costs of a recipient under law ...." Utah
Code Ann. §26-19-2(5)(b)(i). Moreover, Higley
and his parents are wrecipient(s)ff under the statute
as the persons who applied for and received the
medical assistance.

1. For discussion relating to whether the 1984 or
1989 version of the statute applies, sec infra at pp. 34.
2. The Medical Benefits Recovery Act operates in
tandem with the Medical Assistance Act §26-189 to-11 (1989). Section 26-18-10, Utah Medical
Assistance Program, provides in part:
(1) The division shall develop a medical
assistance program, which shall be
known as the Utah Medical Assistance
Program, for low income persons who
are not eligible under the state plan for
Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act or Medicare under Title
XVIII of that act....
(3) The department shall develop standards and administer policies relating to
eligibility requirements for participation
in the program, and for payment of
medical claims for eligible persons.
(4) The program shall be a payor of last
resort. Before assistance is rendered the
division shall investigate the availability
of the resources of the spouse, father,
mother, and adult children of the person
making application.

Cite as
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Dan A. PARK,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 900260-CA
FILED: April 10, 1991
Fourth District, Juab County
Honorable Boyd L. Park
ATTORNEYS:
LeRay G. Jackson, Delta, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Garff.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress and the trial court's
denial of his motion for a directed \erdicu
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Based on this court's recent decision in State
v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Ct.
App. March 15, 1991), we reverse and
remand.
On May 10, 1990, defendant was stopped at
a roadblock on 1-15 about two miles south
of Nephi, Utah. The roadblock, consisting of
about fifteen officers stopping all traffic traveling northbound and southbound except
trucks, was conducted under the supervision
of Utah Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul Mangelson. Notice of the roadblock was published
in the local newspapers two weeks earlier. At
about 8:15 a.m., Officer LuWayne Walkei
stopped defendant's vehicle and requested his
license and registration. During the stop,
Officer Walker detected an odor coming from
the vehicle and noted that defendant was
acting unusual. Officer Walker asked defendant if he was carrying alcohol, firearms or
drugs. All three individuals in the vehicle
looked straight ahead and said nothing. Defendant then quickly turned to Officer Walker
and said "No". Officer Walker then asked
defendant if he would mind if the vehicle was
searched. Defendant responded that it would
be fine. The officer asked defendant to pull to
the side of the road and exit the vehicle. All
three occupants exited and were patted down
for weapons. Small amounts of marijuana
were found on the two passengers. In the
trunk of the vehicle, officers discovered a red
tool box containing five baggies of marijuana
and a twenty dollar bill. A subsequent inventory search of the vehicle revealed a methamphetamine kit under the console next to the
driver's seat. Defendant was charged with
possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute and possession of a controlled substance.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized in the search on the ground that
"1. There was no probable cause nor legal
reason to stop said vehicle. 2. There was no
probable cause to search said vehicle. 3. The
search of said vehicle was illegal and was not
conducted pursuant to legal consent nor pursuant to the legal issuance of > a Search
Warrant." After an evidentiary hearing, defendant submitted a memorandum to the court,
claiming that the warrantless search of the
vehicle was unreasonable in that there is no
statute authorizing such roadblocks and that
the roadblock did not meet the standard under
state and federal caselaw. Defendant's memorandum also asserted that the officer's
request to search the vehicle violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and that the officers
lacked probable cause to justify searching the
trunk and console. The trial court denied the
motion to suppress, stating that the roadblock
minimally inconvenienced the public and was
structured to neutralize the discretion of the
*•/-— ~~~Atmt\no the roadblock. Thus, the

court concluded, the stop was a reasonable
seizure and did not violate defendant's state
or federal constitutional rights. The court also
concluded that defendant voluntarily consented to the search and therefore the search did
not violate defendant's state or federal constitutional rights. During the trial, the court
denied defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. The jury found defendant guilty of
possession of marijuana and of knowingly and
intentionally possessing methamphetamines.
On appeal, defendant raises three issues: 1)
Whether officers had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain or seize the vehicle;
2) Whether defendant's consent was voluntary; and 3) Whether the court erred in
denying his motion for a directed verdict.
We first consider whether the roadblock
violated defendant's fourth amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The State narrowly construes the
issue as a challenge only to whether the officers had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and his vehicle after
the roadblock stop. Under that narrow reading
of the issue, the State claims the issue was not
raised below and therefore may not be raised
on appeal. We disagree with the State's characterization of the issue. Defendant's memorandum in support of the motion to suppress
and his brief clearly address the constitutionality of the roadblock stop. Therefore, the
constitutionality of the roadblock stop is
squarely before this court.
In State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8
(Utah Ct. App. March 15, 1991), this court
addressed the constitutionality of a virtually
identical roadblock stop and held that the
roadblock stop violated defendant's state and
federal constitutional rights. In Sims, defendant was stopped at a roadblock on I-lf
about two miles south of Nephi, Utah. Th<
roadblock, staffed by about ten officers, wa
planned and supervised by Sergeant Pau
Mangelson, and its purpose was to detec
license, registration, liquor and drug violat
ions. Notice of the roadblock was published i
the local paper two to four weeks earliei
Sergeant Mangelson testified that no writte
policy existed governing the roadblock an
that his supervisor gave him permission I
conduct the roadblock. All vehicles wei
stopped, except trucks. At about 9:00 a.m
Trooper Howard stopped Sims and request*
his license and registration. While talking wi
Sims, Trooper Howard saw an open liqu
bottle and shortly thereafter obtained Simi
consent to search the vehicle.
The court, relying on Michigan Dep't
State Police v. Sitzt __U.S.__, 110 S.Ct. 24
(1990), held that because the roadblock v
not carried out pursuant to a plan embodyi
explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct
the individual officers, because the plain s
not developed by politically accountable o

54
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cials, and because there was no indication that
the authorization process involved any balancing of fourth amendment interests, law enforcement interests, or an assessment of the
effectiveness of the roadblock in meeting those
interests, the roadblock violated defendant's
fourth amendment rights.
As in Sims, the roadblock in this case was
two miles south of Nephi, Utah on M 5 , was
supervised by Sergeant Mangleson, and was
publicized in the local paper several weeks
earlier. All traffic except large trucks was
stopped in both this case and in Sims. Sergeant Mangelson testified at the suppression
hearing that the roadblock was authorized by
his supervisor. No other evidence was submitted indicating that the roadblock was carried
out pursuant to a plan with explicit, neutral
limitations on the officers* conduct, or that it
was developed by politically accountable officials. In addition, there was no indication that
the authorization process involved any balancing of interests. Therefore, as in Sims, the
roadblock did not conform to the standard set
forth in Sitz. Therefore, we hold that the
roadblock stop violated defendant's fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.1
We next address whether defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle.
The State contends, as it did in Sims, that this
issue was not raised below and may therefore
not be raised on appeal. Ordinarily, a defendant may not assert a ground for suppressing
evidence if that ground was not asserted in the
trial court. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660
(Utah 1985). However, if a ground for suppressing evidence is unknown or unavailable to
a defendant at the time the motion to suppress
is filed, defendant does not waive his right to
raise that issue. State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53
(Utah 1981).
At the time of defendant's suppression
hearing, in this case and in Sims, Utah case
law provided that a non-coerced search
consent purged the taint of a primary illegality. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. at 13; see State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). However, in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d
684 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court
reversed this court's decision in Stare v.
Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
and held that consent to search a vehicle following a primary illegality must be both noncoerced and not obtained by exploitation of
the primary illegality. Therefore, because this
argument was effectively unavailable to defendant, just as the argument was unavailable to
Sims, defendant did not waive the right to
raise the consent issue.
In Sims, the court addressed whether defendant's consent, given shortly after the roadblock stop and after the officer saw an open
liquor bottle in the vehicle, was sufficiently
attenuated from or an exploitation of the

CODE• CO
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illegal stop. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 1314. The court examined several factors to
evaluate whether the consent was obtained by
exploitation of the stop, including the temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the
consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and fiagrancy of the
illegal police conduct. Id. The court stated
that because the consent was obtained within
minutes of the illegal stop, it was not sufficiently attenuated from the primary illegality to
purge the taint. Further, the court found, the
record did not reveal any intervening circumstances which broke the chain of events which
began with the illegal roadblock. Finally, the
court stated that the purpose of the illegal
police conduct did not correct the constitutional violation. In sum, the court concluded
that Sims's consent was arrived at by exploitation of the illegal roadblock and that all
evidence obtained under that consent must be
suppressed.
In this case, as in Sims, defendant's consent
was obtained within minutes of the illegal
stop. Between the stojy and defendant's
consent to search, no intervening events occurred which broke the chain of events beginning with the illegal roadblock. Finally, the
purpose of the illegal police conduct did not
correct the constitutional violation. See Sims,
156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. Therefore, because
the record demonstrates that defendant's
consent was obtained by exploitation of the
illegal roadblock, we hold that the consent was
invalid and all evidence seized pursuant to that
consent must be suppressed.
Because we reverse the trial court's denial
of the motion to suppress, we need not
address defendant's claim that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict.
Defendant's convictions are reversed and
the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1 CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. We need not address whether the roadblock violated defendant's state constitutional rights because
the roadblock does not pass muster under the
federal constitution.

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

ADDENDUM B

STATE'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI IN STATE V. SIMS
(in pertinent part)

POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED STATE V. ARROYO,
796 P.2D 684 (UTAH 1990), IN A MANNER THAT
APPEARS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH FLORIDA V,
ROYER, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), WHICH ARROYO
IDENTIFIED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE APPLICATION
OF THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE TWO-PART
TEST FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF CONSENT
TO SEARCH; THE ARROYO TEST SHOULD BE
CLARIFIED BY THIS COURT.
After the court of appeals had determined that the
roadblock was unconstitutional under the federal and state
constitutions, it then addressed the question of whether the
drugs seized from defendant's vehicle were nevertheless
admissible because their seizure resulted from a search conducted
pursuant to defendant's consent.

Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13-

14.
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that
defendant did not challenge the voluntariness of his consent to
the search, but that he claimed that "there was insufficient
attenuation between his detention and the consent . . . to purge

the taint of the illegality of the detention,,"

I£. at 13. It

noted that under State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), "to
be constitutionally valid, a search consent following illegal
police behavior must be both noncoerced and not arrived at by
exploitation of the primary police illegality."

Ibid.

Applying

the factors outlined in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975),
for evaluating the "non-exploitation or attenuation element," the
court held that "the record demonstrates that [defendant]'s
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of
the illegal roadblock."

JTd. at 14.

In arriving at this

conclusion, the court relied most heavily on two factors: (1)
"the consent was obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, and
not even under our clear error standard of review could the trial
court find enough time between the stop and the grant of consent
to attenuate the relationship between the two;" and (2) the
record revealed no possibility of intervening circumstances
between the illegal stop and [defendant]'s grant of consent to
the search.

Ibid.

In Arroyo, this Court did not make clear how the
exploitation analysis is to proceed, saying only that the primary
inquiry is whether the consent was sufficiently "attenuated" from
the prior illegality such that the consent was not "tainted" by
that illegality.

796 P.2d at 690-91. The Court noted the Brown

v. Illinois factors which should be considered, ici. at 690-91
n.4, but did not make clear whether the primary focus of the
exploitation analysis is the possible effect of the initial
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent or rather
-9-

the police misconduct itself*

Arrovo cites numerous cases on the

issue of exploitation, id., at 690-91, but does not express a
preference for one of the two approaches those cases appear to
adopt.
For example, some of the cases clearly talk about the
exploitation question in terms of the potential effect of the
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent. See,
e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1987)
("[W]e hold that the consent was the product of the illegal
detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable stop was not
sufficiently attenuated. . . • [T]here were insufficient
intervening circumstances that might have reduced the coercive
nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to make a
voluntary decision about the consent search."); United States v.
Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no intervening events
or lapse of time which would show [the defendant's] consent was
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of
the unlawful invasion'"); State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 298
(La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot
say that [the defendant's] consent was sufficiently attenuated
from the illegal arrest and search to be a product of her free
will.").
On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether
the voluntariness of the consent had been undermined by the
police misconduct.

These cases seem to focus solely on the

police misconduct and how it may "taint" the consent such that
•10-

the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine.

See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-

Gonzalez. 727 F.2d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Thompson. 712 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom.
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980).
This approach was followed by the court of appeals in the instant
case.
The former approach, which focuses primarily on the
possible effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of
the consent, appears to be most consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491
(1983), which this Court identified as an example of the
application of the exploitation part of the two-part test adopted
in Arroyo.

796 P.2d at 690. There, in concluding that the

defendant's consent to the search of his luggage was tainted by
the prior illegal police detention, a majority of the Supreme
Court appears to have been most concerned with the coercive
circumstances under which the consent to search had been obtained
and the effect that those circumstances had on the voluntariness
of the consent.

Rover. 460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., concurring)

("I agree with the plurality that . . . [the defendant's]
surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot be viewed as
consensual.").
Because the court of appeals has construed the
exploitation prong of Arroyo to focus primarily on the "temporal
proximity" and "intervening circumstances" factors suggested in
that case, and has implicitly rejected the alternative view that
-11-

the primary focus is the possible effect of the prior police
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent —

a view

seemingly adopted in Rover. it has decided an important question
of law which was not decided in Arroyo. but which should be
decided by this Court*

Utah R. App. P. 46(d),

Accordingly/ the

Court should grant certiorari and review the court of appeals'
decision.

/A—
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

M ^"day of May, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
(/
Assistant Attorney General
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the cases cited by the state are readily distinguishable in that no case involves two sets of Miranda
warnings-the first followed by an equivocal
request for counsel and the second followed by
apparent waiver-as is the case before us. The
cases, with the exception of Martin which we treat
more fully in the text, instead involve some variation on the Elstad theme-statements made
without Miranda warnings, followed by Miranda
warnings, waiver, and further statements.
The state additionally cites, in a letter submitted
after argument on the petition for rehearing, State
v. Christoffcrson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), claiming that this court there 'held that [a]
second set fof warnings] served as a clarification of
the equivocal request/ We do not read Christoffcrson this way. The police officers in Christoffcrson
apparently ceased questioning after the equivocal
request for counsel, and proceeded to clarify the
defendant's equivocal request. Once they did so and
learned that the defendant did not desire counsel,
the officers continued interrogation. Id. at 947. We
hesitate to read the decision as equating a mere
second administration of Miranda warnings, even if
no Miranda rights were then invoked, with definitive
clarification of an equivocal request for counsel.
Such an important and far-reaching conclusion
would surely have been accompanied by lengthy
discussion and analysis, which is not to be found in
the opinion, and is at odds with language in the
opinion noting that clarifying questions were asked
prior to proceeding with a second set of warnings
and further interrogation. See id.
6. The slate's proffered analysis is further flawed in
that the bright-line rule of Edwards, cited in Minnick
v. Mississippi for "clarity of its command*
and "certainty of its application," 111 S.Ct. at 490,
would be undermined if courts were required to
receive evidence pertaining to the lack of coercion
attending an equivocal voluntariness of waiver of
the request for counsel. In addition to breeding
contempt for a cherished constitutional right, significant judicial resources would be needlessly expended, a result clearly eschewed in Edwards and its
progeny.
7. Insofar as Martin's view of an analogy between
an equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent
and an equivocal request for counsel might suggest
otherwise, we reject that view. Cf. Roberson, 486
U.S. at 683 (emphasizing distinction between exercise of right to terminate interrogation and remain
silent and right to counsel).
8. The state also argues that even if defendant's
statements must be suppressed, the derivative physical evidence, chiefly the victim's body, would be
properly admitted, presumably by way of photographs and descriptive testimony. The state proceeds
upon the assumption that the interrogation subsequent to defendant's equivocal reference to counsel,
concededly a violation of the Miranda rule, was
merely technically defective, not constitutionally
infirm. The state calls our attention to several decisions in which other courts have allowed the admission of derivative evidence obtained subsequent to
interrogation conducted in violation of the technical
rules of Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1987), cert, denied,
ASS U.S. 922 (1988); In re Owen F„ 70 Md. App.
678, 523 A.2d 627, cert, denied, 310 Md. 275, 528
A.2d 1286 (1987); State v. Wcthercd, 110 Wash. 2d
466, 755 P.2d 797 (1988). We find the cases cited by
the state to be inapplicable, as each addresses viol-

ations of the Miranda rule which are not deemed
constitutional in dimension. We have already held in
evaluating the state's Elstad argument that the violation of defendant's right to counsel was of constitutional dimension and not merely a violation of
Miranda,
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment is properly suppressed under the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 18. See, e.g.t Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S.
51, 52 (1985) (interrogation subsequent to request
for counsel violates Fifth Amendment). See also Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 & n.3 (1984). While
we are not ignorant of the obstacles which the state
will face in presenting a case on remand without
evidence of the body absent the applicability of
some exception to the exclusionary rule, see Sampson,
143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18 & n.19, the
derivative evidence of the child's body was obtained
as a direct result of interrogation that was improper
as a matter of constitutional law, and must, absent
some exception, be suppressed. We are not enthusiastic about the obstacles our decision will create to
securing defendant's conviction on retrial. But we
are unwilling to sidestep important constitutional
safeguards to assuage the frustrations that inhere in
retrying a defendant clearly guilty of such a heinous
crime. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 442.
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OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Louie Edwin Sims appeals his conviction of
possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute for value, Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-8(1 )(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), a second
degree felony. Sims claims the stop of his
vehicle in a roadblock conducted by the Utah
Highway Patrol was an unreasonable seizure
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under the fourth amendment to the United I produced a valid Georgia driver's license and
States Constitution and under article I, section a Utah registration in his name. In response to
14 of the Utah Constitution.
the trooper's question, Sims stated that he
Following oral argument, three cases rele- was en route from Los Angeles to Salt Lake
vant to the issues presented in this appeal were City. While talking with Sims, Trooper
decided. Those cases are Michigan Dep't of Howard smelled alcohol inside the sedan and
State Police v. Sitz, _ U . S . _ , 110 S.Ct. 2481 saw an "open" liquor bottle in the back seat
(1990); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah area. He asked Sims if there were any alcohol,
1990); and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 weapons, or drugs in the vehicle. Sims admi(Utah 1990). Accordingly, we granted Sims' tted that there was alcohol in the vehicle, but
motion for supplemental briefing. Having denied carrying drugs or weapons.
considered the supplemental briefs, we now
Howard then asked Sims to exit the sedan,
reverse his conviction, and remand for a new and asked for consent to look inside. Sims
trial in which evidence seized from Sims' consented. Sergeant Mangelson approached
vehicle is to be suppressed.
and helped Howard search the car's interior.
They
discovered the remnants of one or two
FACTS
marijuana cigarettes in the right rear passenger
On the morning of July 27, 1988, officers
door ashtray. Howard then asked Sims if he
from the Utah Highway Patrol and Juab
would mind if they searched the trunk of the
County Sheriffs Office conducted a roadbsedan. Sims agreed and opened the trunk.
lock on Interstate Highway 15 approximately
Mangelson searched the trunk while Howard
two miles south of Nephi, Utah. The roadbconducted field sobriety tests on Sims nearby.
lock was planned and supervised by Utah
In a suitcase in the trunk, Mangelson discHighway Patrol Sergeant Paul Mangelson.1 Its
overed two small plastic bags containing
purpose *as to detect driver's license, automarijuana. Sims, becoming visibly nervous,
mobile registration, and equipment violations,
then stated that he wanted the search stopped.
as well as liquor and drug violations. Notice
Mangelson told Sims that, based on the discthat the roadblock would take place was
overy of marijuana, he had probable cause to
published in the Juab County Times News two
continue searching the trunk. Looking in the
to four weeks prior to the roadblock. There
spare tire well, Mangelson found a kilogram
was no evidence that the News was distributed
brick of cocaine. Sims was then arrested for
outside of Juab County. Interstate 15 is a
driving under the influence of alcohol and
major north-south route and link between
possession of a controlled substance.
Salt Lake City, Utah and Los Angeles, CalifBefore trial, Sims filed a motion to suppress
ornia.
all evidence seized from his vehicle, contenAccording to Mangelson, no written policy, ding that the roadblock stop was an unlawful
from the Highway Patrol or from any other seizure under the Utah and federal constitutsource, existed to guide the conduct of the ions and that the officers lacked probable
roadblock in question. Mangelson indicated cause to search the trunk. Following an evidthat his supervising lieutenant had given him entiary hearing, the trial court denied Sims'
permission to conduct the roadblock.
motion. The court determined that (1) the
The roadblock was staffed by about ten roadblock stop did not violate the Utah or
uniformed officers. A series of three signs federal constitutions; (2) Sims voluntarily
within a one-half mile distance directed consented to the search of the vehicle, includrivers to the roadblock, marked by orange ding the trunk; and (3) Sergeant Mangelson
cones. Large trucks were not stopped, because had probable cause to continue searching the
stopping them might cause hazardous traffic trunk after Sims' withdrawal of consent.
congestion. Sergeant Mangelson instructed Based on the evidence presented at the suppofficers to inspect driver's licenses and vehicle ression hearing and on the parties* written
registration of the stopped motorists; while stipulation xo the evidence, the trial court
doing this, they were to watch for signs of found Sims guilty of possession of a controliquor and drug violations. Officers could hold lled substance with intent to distribute.
vehicles for further investigation if the initial
contact raised questions. One of the officers,
ISSUES
Trooper Carl Howard, indicated that his
On appeal, Sims argues that (1) the roadbpractice also included asking all drivers, reg- lock stop of his vehicle violated his right to be
ardless of suspicion, if they had alcohol, free from unreasonable searches and seizures
weapons, or contraband in their vehicles.2
under article I, section 14 of the Utah ConstAt approximately 9:00 a.m., Sims' vehicle, itution and the fourth amendment to the
a Chrysler sedan, was stopped at the roadb- United States Constitution; and (2) there was
lock. Trooper Howard, the first officer to insufficient attenuation between the unlawful
contact Sims, saw nothing to cause him to detention and any consent to overcome the
suspect a violation of the law as Sims' vehicle illegality of the roadblock.
approached. 3 Howard asked for Sims* I
driver's license and vehicle registration. Sims I
UTAH ADVAM
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ROADBLOCK
Sims' first point on appeal deals solely with
the permissibility of the roadblock itself.
Because it is undisputed that the roadblock
was conducted with neither a warrant nor
suspicion of wrongdoing by Sims, and that no
emergency situation necessitated it, the question of whether the roadblock was improper is
reduced to one of law, and we review it
without deference to the trial court. Scharf v.
BMC Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985);
State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
The State neither contests nor accepts Sims'
arguments that the roadblock violated the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. Rather, the State invites us to
decide this case solely on the basis of the attenuation issue. That is, we are to "assum[e]
arguendo that the stop was illegal," and
remand this case for fact finding on whether
Sims' consent to search his vehicle was obtained through exploitation of the stop.
We believe it inappropriate in this case,
however, to simply assume that the roadblock
was unconstitutional, without analysis. Sims
has steadfastly and thoroughly argued the
unconstitutionality of the roadblock, on both
federal and state grounds, throughout these
proceedings.4 The transcript of the suppression
hearing and the trial court's written findings
on the issue provide an ample factual record
from which we can assess the constitutionality
of this roadblock. The issue, therefore, has
been properly preserved and squarely presented on appeal.
We are aware of the rule that we should
avoid addressing constitutional issues unless
required to do so. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d
1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). This roadblock,
however, was not an isolated incident, and our
police may continue to use suspicionless roadblocks as a law enforcement tool.5 This
makes all Utah motorists subject to closer
police scrutiny than they might expect or,
arguably, be legitimately required to encounter.
The right of citizens to be secure from
unreasonable seizures "shall not be violated."
U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I,
§14 (emphasis added). A roadblock or motorist "checkpoint" is a seizure under the
fourth amendment, Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, _ U . S . _ , 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485
(1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); there is no reason to
hold otherwise with respect to our state constitution. For the benefit of our citizens, as well
as that of police charged with enforcing our
laws, it behooves us to decide whether the
roadblock that netted Sims was constitutionally permissible. We hold that it was not.
Statutory Authority to Conduct Roadblocks.

A prelude to the constitutional analysis per
se is a determination of whether any statutory
authority either permits or prohibits roadblocks of the sort conducted here, that is, a
suspicionless, investigatory roadblock in which
vehicles and drivers are screened for possible
violations of law.* We note several statutes of
interest, but none apply here.
The Utah Department of Transportation
operates ports of entry at which all large
vehicles and vehicles transporting livestock are
stopped and inspected for, among other
things, driver qualifications, registration, tax
payments, size and weight, and safety. Utah
Code Ann. §27-12-19 (Supp. 1990). Our
fish and game laws give the Division of Wildlife authority to conduct roadblocks or game
checking stations under Utah Code Ann. §2320-19 (1984), which makes it unlawful to fail
to stop at such stations. These provisions are
obviously inapplicable here.
We also note that the Utah Highway Patrol
is charged with the duty of "regulat(ing]
traffic on all highways and roads of the
state." Utah Code Ann. §27-10-4(l)(b)
(1989). This provision might authorize roadblock-type operations at, for example, accident scenes, or where hazardous road or
traffic conditions require extra control.
However, because this section in no way
implies authority to conduct investigatory
operations, it does not apply here.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1990) allows
a peace officer to "stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions."7
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. §41-M7(c)
(1988) requires officers to stop a vehicle for
driver's license, registration, and general inspection "upon reasonable belief that any
vehicle is being operated in violation of any
provision of this act or of any other law regulating the operation of vehicles ...." These
codifications of the familiar "reasonable suspicion" standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), were clearly not enacted with roadblock-type stops in mind; rather, they apply to
the singling out of particular individuals or
vehicles by the police, based on particularized
suspicion.
We find nothing in the Utah code that
specifically prohibits the roadblock that was
conducted here, however. Therefore, we query
whether the roadblock was constitutionally
prohibited.
Fourth Amendment.
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979),
the United States Supreme Court implied that
roadblock stops for the purpose of checking
driver's licenses and vehicle registrations
might be constitutionally permitted. Holding
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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that a routine stop of an individual vehicle for
such purpose, without articulable individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, was impermissible under the fourth amendment, the Court
commented that "[t]his holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States
from developing methods for spot checks that
involve less intrusion or that do not involve
the unconstrained exercise of discretion.
Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative/ Id.
at 663.
The Prouse dictum fell on receptive ears,
and in S/rz, the Court considered an investigatory roadblock, a "sobriety checkpoint/
operated by the Michigan State Police Department. The checkpoint was operated under
guidelines created by a special state advisory
committee composed of law enforcement
officials and transportation researchers from
the University of Michigan. Those guidelines
governed checkpoint publicity, site selection,
and police procedure at the checkpoint itself.
S/rz, 110 S.Ct. at 2483-84.
Under the guidelines, all motorists traveling
through the checkpoint were stopped and
briefly checked for intoxication. Only if the
initial examination revealed signs of intoxication would a motorist would be directed out
of the traffic flow for a driver's license and
registration check and further sobriety tests.
The Sitz checkpoint was maintained for one
hour and fifteen minutes. During that time,
126 vehicles were stopped for an average of
twenty-five seconds each. The checkpoint
yielded two arrests-approximately one and
one-half percent of stopped drivers-for
driving under the influence. Id. at 2484.
Utilizing a balancing test developed in United
States v. Martinez-Fucrtc,
428 U.S.
543 (1976) and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979), the Supreme Court held that Michigan's sobriety checkpoint passed fourth
amendment muster. The brief detention of
motorists at the checkpoint was found to be
only a "slight" infringement of their fourth
amendment interests. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2486.
Outweighing this infringement were "the
magnitude of the drunken driving problem
[and] the States' interest in eradicating i t / id.
at 2485, along with the Court's assessment
that the one and one-half percent drunk
driver arrest rate demonstrated that the checkpoint adequately advanced that interest. Id.
at 2487-88; see also Brown, 443 U.S. at 5051 and cases cited therein (permissibility of
non-arrest seizure requires weighing public
interest served thereby, degree to which it
serves the interest, and severity of interference
with individual liberty).
According to the testimony of Sergeant
Mangelson and Trooper Howard, the roadblock in the present case was of an "allpurpose" variety. All vehicles except trucks
were checked for licenses, registration, equi-

11

pment problems, driver sobriety, and signs of
illicit drugs, without any suspicion of wrongdoing. The trial court, focusing on the last
purpose, performed a balancing test as described above. It held that "a history of escalating drug traffic along this stretch of Interstate
15 as a result of other arrests, tends to legitimize the public interest in predetermined check
points, systematically pursued by officers to
minimize the burden to individual citizens
without discretion to engage in random roving
stops/ 1 Without passing judgment on the
accuracy of the trial court's balancing, we
believe that analysis was premature and therefore erroneous.
As we read Sitz, Martinez-Fuertc, and Brown,
a fourth amendment balancing test
applies to warrantless seizures that, if not
based upon articulable suspicion of an individual, "musf be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers/ Brown, 443
U.S. at 51 (emphasis added). Additionally,
such a plan should be developed by
"politically accountable officials" with a
"unique understanding of, and a responsibility
for, limited, public resources, including a finite
number of police officers." Sitz, 110 S.Ct at
2487. Those officials, and not the courts, are
responsible for performing the initial balancing between the fourth amendment and the
interests served by the plan. Id. While the Sitz
sobriety checkpoint met these requirements,
the roadblock used here did not.
No explicit plan, beyond a determination
that all vehicles other than large trucks were to
be stopped, governed this roadblock.9 Nor
does it appear that Sergeant Mangelson or the
lieutenant who gave him permission to
conduct the roadblock are politically accountable officials as contemplated in Sitz.10 The
process by which the roadblock was authorized also lacked features of political accountability that were arguably present in Sitr. the
Sitz roadblock was authorized pursuant to
careful advance study that included nonpolice public officials, while authority for this
roadblock arose solely within a police agency.
Finally, there is no indication that the authorization process here involved any balancing of
fourth amendment interests and law enforcement interests, or an assessment of the effectiveness of the roadblock in meeting those
interests. Instead, the lack of any written
guidelines arising from the authorization
process strongly suggests that no such analysis
took place.
The requirement of explicit guidelines,
developed in a politically accountable manner
that includes balancing of the relevant concerns, is, under Sitz, a prerequisite to any
judicial balancing analysis of a suspicionless
roadblock.11 After-the-fact judicial balancing of the interests implicated by such a
roadblock cannot make it constitutionally
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proper. Therefore, we hold that the roadblock
in which Sims was detained violated the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution.12
Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 14.
The Sitz emphasis on roadblock guidelines
stresses the principle that when police operations interfere with fourth amendment interests, "the discretion of the official in the field
[must] be circumscribed, at least to some
extent/ Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
661 (1979) (citations omitted). Sitz implicitly
places both guideline development and the
decision to utilize suspicionless roadblocks in
the first place in the hands of "politically
accountable" officials. We view roadblock
authorization and guideline development as
separate steps, however. The initial decision to
permit suspicionless roadblocks is especially
critical, and requires a higher degree of political accountability than the guideline development step. Sims argues that the lack of statutory authority renders suspicionless roadblocks improper under the Utah Constitution.
As regards the initial authority to permit such
roadblocks, we agree.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution is virtually identical to the fourth amendment. Like its federal counterpart, it consists
of a "reasonableness" clause and a "warrant"
clause:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be
seized.
In Srafe v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, decrying the
United States Supreme Court's "vacillation
between the warrant approach and the reasonableness approach" regarding automobile
searches, id. at 469, reaffirmed its commitment to the warrant approach under our
constitution, stating that "(w)arrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable
unless exigent circumstances require action
before a warrant can be obtained." Id. at 470
(quoting Srafe v. Christenscn, 676 P.2d 408,
411 (Utah 1984)).
In Larocco, a car theft suspect's expectation
of privacy in the interior of the subject car,
parked unattended and unlocked on a public
street, triggered the application of article I,
section 14. 794 P.2d at 468-69. Police officers' warrantless opening of the car's door to
view the vehicle identification number on the
doorjamb was found to constitute a search
subject to the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement. The search was then held impr-
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oper under article I, section 14, because there
was no threat that the car would disappear
before a warrant could be obtained to look
inside it. The court held that such 'exigent
circumstances" to support a warrantless search
did not exist where the car was not en route
away from the officers' jurisdiction and the
suspect had not been alerted to police interest
in it. Id. at 470-71.
Under article 1, section 14 our supreme
court applies a * warrants whenever possible"
policy to motor vehicle searches and seizures.
Id. This policy is consistent with one fundamental purpose of constitutional search and
seizure limits: the interposition of neutral
authority between police seeking evidence of
crimes and the citizens from whom such evidence is sought.13
In the usual non-exigent circumstances
search and seizure scenario, the judicial
branch, through a magistrate, serves as the
neutral authority that issues or denies a
warrant to perform a search or seizure. The
warrant is issued only when probable cause
exists. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const,
art. I, §14. Our state legislature, however,
has also served as a neutral authority between
our police and our citizens, in authorizing
certain seizures upon less than probable cause.
As already noted, our legislature has followed the courts' lead in authorizing brief
warrantless stops of individuals and motor
vehicles based on reasonable suspicion.14 Also
as noted, the legislature has acted independently in authorizing ports of entry, as well as
fish and game checkpoints. These operations,
supported by neither warrants nor any level of
individualized suspicion, clearly implicate
article I, section \A of our constitution.
From an operational standpoint, ports of
entry and fish and game checkpoints closely
resemble the roadblock that was conducted in
this case, in that all large trucks, or all vehicles used by hunters, respectively, are submitted to official inspections. However, in authorizing these operations, our legislature has,
presumably, weighed the need for such suspicionless inspections against their intrusion
upon individual liberty,15 a process analogous
to that performed by a magistrate in the issuance of a warrant. A high degree of political
accountability for the institution of these
practices can also be presumed, in that representatives of truckers, hunters, law enforcement, and the citizenry at large all very likely
played a part in passing the relevant statutes.
In each case of legislation authorizing specific types of checkpoints or stops of persons
or vehicles, with or without individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing, the citizens of this
state have acted through their elected representatives. Therefore, the collective will of the
people is expressed and, furthermore, the
people have notice of duly authorized police
activity.
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In stark contrast, the roadblock conducted I
in this case was authorized solely by police
officers, the very people whose behavior
article I, section 14 is intended to limit. No
non-law enforcement officials took part in
the decision to set up the roadblock. Leaving
the initial decision to conduct such operations
in police hands creates a scheme that is both
unrealistic and constitutionally untenable.
We believe that legislative authorization of
ports of entry and fish and game checkpoints,
like the issuance of a judicial warrant, triggers
at least some presumption that these law enforcement practices are constitutionally permissible. Because the roadblock in this case had
neither form of authorization, it was entitled
to no such presumption. Both warrants and
statutes originate outside the executive branch,
serving to check abuses of that branch's law
enforcement power. Consistent with our
supreme court's emphasis on the warrant
requirement, then, we hold that suspicionless,
investigatory motor vehicle roadblocks, conducted without legislative authorization, are
per se unconstitutional under article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution.
In requiring legislative authority as a prerequisite to the use of suspicionless investigatory roadblocks, we join two other western
states that have similarly construed their constitutions. See, e.g., Srare v. Henderson, 114
Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988); Nelson v.
Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692
(1987)." At least one other state has established the same standard under the fourth
amendment. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562
(Okla. App. 1984). This approach is particularly appropriate where a proposed police
practice will, as here, affect everyone travelling our state's highways. Because of its close
ties to the citizens whose rights will be affected, the minimum necessary political accountability for such practices lies, at the outset,
with our legislature.
Our holding that article I, section 14 prohibits suspicionless investigative roadblocks
without legislative authority, in effect, requires
the legislature to perform the S/fz-type balancing function if and when it decides to
consider the authorization of such roadblocks.
Judicial balancing of the interests implicated
by such roadblocks, then, will need to occur
only if and when the legislature, upon performing such balancing itself, decides to authorize them." We, unlike our colleague in his
concurring opinion, prefer that the legislature
announce its view of public policy and the
philosophy of Utah's citizenry as regards
roadblocks, prior to the court applying constitutional analysis to the legislature's product.M
We also emphasize that our holding on the
state constitutionality of the roadblock in
which Sims was stopped is limited in its app- I
lication to similar, non-emergency situations.

It is not intended to apply to emergency roadblocks that might, for example, be used to
apprehend a fleeing felon. Nor do we intend
to impede any existing authority to conduct
roadblocks for traffic control purposes. Any
constitutional challenge to these types of
traffic stops awaits another day. It is the suspicionless, investigative, non-emergency
roadblock, conducted in the absence of legislative authority, that we hold to be unconstitutional.
ATTENUATION OF CONSENT FROM
ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK
Sims argues that there was insufficient attenuation between his detention and the consent
he gave to search his vehicle to purge the taint of
the illegality of the detention. He does not claim
that his consent was coerced from him and was
therefore involuntary. Rather, he argues that
because there were no intervening circumstances
between the detention and the consent, the consent was the fruit of the illegal detention, and,
therefore, evidence seized pursuant to his consent should have been ordered suppressed. Sims
did not mak.e this argument in the trial court.
Normally, "where a defendant fails to assert
a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully
obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that ground on
appeal." State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660
(Utah 1985); see also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d
65, 71 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Utah R.
Crim. P. 12. Unless a ground for suppression
is "unknown or unavailable" to a defendant at
the time a suppression motion is filed, the
right to challenge the admission of evidence on
that ground is waived. State v. Lee, 633 P.2d
48, 53 (Utah 1981). Here, however, because
our then-standing decisions effectively held
that a non-coerced search consent, by itself,
purged the taint of a primary illegality, Sims*
non-attenuation argument was unavailable to
him in the trial court and would have been
pointless to assert. See State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Therefore, it is proper to address that argument
now.
In Srare v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, reversing this
court's holding in Srare v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d
153, 155-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), held that,
to be constitutionally valid, a search consent
following illegal police behavior must be both
noncoerced and not arrived at by exploitation
of the primary police illegality. Factors used to
evaluate the non-exploitation or attenuation
element are derived from Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590 (1975), which involved a confession obtained from a criminal suspect after
his illegal arrest. They include the temporal
proximity of the primary illegality and the
granting of consent, the presence or absence
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of intervening circumstances, and the purpose I to the question of whether a search consent
and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. AT- flowed from, i.e., was an exploitation of, the
royo% 796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4 (citing Brown, All illegal police conduct.31 Instead, it appears to
U.S. at 603-04, and 3 W. LaFave, Search and I be an alternative approach, inviting us to
overlook unconstitutional police conduct that
Seizure §8.2(d), at 193-94 (2d ed. 1987)).
The Arroyo case was remanded to the trial serves good purposes and is not too flagrant.
court for fact finding on the issue of whether
Troopers Howard and Mangelson testified
the defendant's consent to search his vehicle at some length about their expertise in drug
was attenuated from or an exploitation of his interdiction, and the trial court treated the
illegal stop. Because the burden is on the State roadblock as if that was its primary purpose.
to show that evidence obtained following However noble this purpose might be, it was
illegal police conduct is attenuated from the pursued by an unauthorized means. The troillegality, Brown, All U.S. at 604, and because opers each had years of law enforcement
the attenuation issue was not presented to the experience, and can properly be charged with
trial court, a remand to examine the attenua- awareness that their action was not authorized
tion factors has been suggested here. We find, by law. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
however, that the record now before us cont- insidious encroachment by men of zeal, wellains "sufficient detail and depth" to allow us meaning but without understanding." Olmsto determine the issue as a matter of law. See id. tend v. United States, 111 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)
Regarding the temporal proximity factor, (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using ten to twelve
the record demonstrates a very short time span law officers to staff the roadblock may have
between Sims' stop in the roadblock and also left distant parts of the largely rural jurTrooper Howard's request to search his aut- isdiction with delayed police assistance in the
omobile. The trooper had but a brief conver- event of need. Thus, although it does not
sation with Sims, regarding his license and appear that the officers behaved abusively
registration, his trip itinerary, and possession toward those stopped at the roadblock, this
of alcohol, guns, or contraband, before asking does not correct the constitutional violation.
for consent to search his car. The consent was
In sum, the record demonstrates that Sims'
obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by
and not even under our clear error standard of exploitation of the illegal roadblock. Accordreview could the trial court find enough time ingly, that consent was invalid. Because the
between the stop and the grant of consent to exclusionary rule applies to violations of both
attenuate the relationship between the two.19
the fourth amendment and article I, section 14
Nor does the record reveal any possibility of of the Utah Constitution, State v. Larocco,
intervening circumstances between the illegal 794 P.2d 460, 471-73 (Utah 1990), all evidstop and Sims' grant of consent to the search. ence obtained under that consent must be
Such circumstances must be independent of suppressed.
the primary illegality. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONTINUE
91. Here, Trooper Howard's request for
SEARCH
consent to search Sims' sedan was based upon
Troopers
Howard
and Mangelson believed
the smell of alcohol, the sight of the open
that
the
discovery
of
marijuana
in Sims* sedan
liquor bottle in the sedan, and Sims' admission, uneventful since the bottle was in under the consent search gave them probable
obvious view, that he was carrying alcohol. cause to continue searching after consent was
Howard's opportunity to make these observ- withdrawn. However, because the initial
ations and to question Sims, however, depe- consent was invalid, any probable cause found
nded entirely on the illegal roadblock. Neither while searching under that consent was also
Sims' driving nor the external appearance of invalid. Absent probable cause to search the
his vehicle justified stopping him. Nothing sedan without Sims' consent, we need not
occurred which could have reasonably made reach the issue of whether exigent circumstahim feel free to proceed on his journey at any nces existed to make the warrant requirement
time between the moment of his stop and the inapplicable.
discoveries that prompted the trooper's
CONCLUSION
request for consent to search his vehicle.20
Sims' conviction for possession of a contrSims did not spontaneously volunteer his olled substance with intent to distribute is
consent, but gave it only when asked. Sims' reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial
consent, then, arose from an unbroken chain court for proceedings in accord with this
of events that began with the illegal roadb- opinion.
lock.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
The final factor in the attenuation analysis
is an examination of the purpose and flagr- I CONCUR:
ancy of the primary police illegality. Here, this I Norman H. Jackson, Judge
factor, unlike the first two, appears unrelated
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ORME, J. (concurring specially):
While I otherwise concur fully in the court's
opinion, 1 have two difficulties with the discussion treating the roadblock under article I,
section 14, of the Utah Constitution. First, if
the roadblock cannot even be validated under
the questionable "balancing* approach of
Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), see,
e.g., id. at 2490-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
we have no need to examine whether it might
be additionally invalid under the state constitution. Second, and more importantly, 1 am
not enthusiastic about suggesting that the
legislature, any more than the courts or the
police, should be about the business of balancing away important constitutional protections that safeguard all of us so that law enforcement can more readily catch an occasional
law-breaker. The citizen's right to be free
from police intrusion in the total absence of
even the least suspicion of wrong-doing
should simply not be at the mercy of the legislature's determination of how tourism or our
hopes for the Olympics might somehow be
adversely impacted by one law enforcement
technique or another.
If it were necessary to reach the state constitutional issue in this case, i.e., if the roadblock passed muster under the federal constitution, 1 would be more inclined to solidify
longstanding constitutional precepts as at the
core of article I, section 14, than to borrow
the troublesome "balancing" approach embraced in Sitz, adopt some variation of that
approach, and begin a journey down that
nebulous path. CL State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460, 469 (Utah 1990) (state constitutional
analysis employed "to simplify ... the search
and seizure rules so that they can be more
easily followed by the police and the courts
and, at the same time, provide the public with
consistent and predictable protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures."). I would
probably prefer to hold that the rule of Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), uniformly applied
by Utah courts, is a matter of Utah constitutional law that simply may not be balanced
away by any branch of our government and
that is not amenable to a roadblock exception.
Under established Utah decisional law, in
the absence of any individualized suspicion,
only a level one stop is permitted. E.g., State
v. Jackson, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 65 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); Srare v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537,
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Trujillo,
739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A
level one stop is a purely voluntary encounter.
Id. And one does not lose the right to decline
to participate in a level one encounter simply
because one chooses to drive rather than to
walk. See State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881
- . . ~- K— IOROV State v. Johnson, 111
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other grounds, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah
Feb. 7, 1991). See also, Delaware v. Prowsc,
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (persons do not lose
the protections of fourth amendment "when
they step from the sidewalk into their automobiles"); State v. Talbot, 789 P.2d 489, 491,
494 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
If, as seems clear, the police cannot require
every pedestrian on a stretch of sidewalk to
stop and answer police inquiries, I am hardpressed to see how they can stop every car on
a stretch of the interstate highway and require
the driver to answer inquiries. In my view, the
only roadblock that is sure to pass state constitutional muster is one which would qualify
as a level-one stop. Cf. Little v. State, 300
Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1989) (roadblock
upheld where motorists avoiding roadblock or
otherwise refusing to cooperate not detained).
I see no constitutional problem with a roadside police checkpoint announced by a sign on
the freeway, "Police Roadblock Next Exit.
Your Cooperation in Answering Police Inquiries Appreciated." Most drivers would stop,
even though they could not be required to,
just as most pedestrians will stop and respond
to police inquiries on the sidewalk. But on
neither medium of travel can one suspected of
nothing illegal whatsoever be compelled to do
so.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Sergeant Mangelson's efforts to thwart illegal
drug trafficking are well known in Utah's appellate
courts. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (reversing
Srare v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App,
1989)); Srare v. Ear), 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State
v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Srare v. Aquihr, 756 P.2d 457 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). See also United States v. Corral, 899 F.2d
991 (10th Cir. 1990). Besides the present case, at
least one other case involving an automobile search
by Sergeant MangeJson is pending in this court. Srare
v. Kitchen, No. 900307-CA. As a central
player in at least five published search and seizure
scenarios to date, the redoubtable trooper's notoriety is approaching that of Max 25, a narcotics
detection'dog whose nose for crime has figured in at
least seven published federal cases in the District of
Columbia Circuit. See United States v. Co/yer, 878
F.2d 469, 471 and n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and cases
cited therein,
2. As indicated by the following exchange at the
suppression hearing, an affirmative answer to this
question could prompt Trooper Howard to then
seek consent to search automobiles without any
other suspicion of wrongdoing:
Q (Mr. Mctos): Just out of curiosity,
did anybody answer 'yes" Jto query
about alcohol, weapons, or contraband!
when everything appeared in order so
you would have to conduct a further
search?
A (Trooper Howard): Yes. I've had
several people do that.
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3. Re-cross examination of Trooper Howard by
defense counsel included the following exchange:
Q: You had no reason to believe [Sims]
was doing anything wrong as he entered
the roadblock or breaking any law; is
that correct?
A: That's correct.
4. By thoroughly briefing state constitutional concerns in his argument, Sims has answered calls by
Utah's appellate courts for a state constitutional
analysis of search and seizure issues. See, e.g., Earl,
716 P.2d at 805-06; State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d
425,426 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing cases).
5. See, e.g., State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
6. Under our characterization of thfs roadblock, it
does not fit into the traditional "three levels" of
police stops, that have been described as follows:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
[any time] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if
the officer has an "articulable suspicion*
that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime; however, the
"detention must be temporary and last
no longer than necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has
been committed or is being committed.
Sfafe v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Merritt,
736 F.2d 223. 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476
U.S. 1142 (1986)). The level of individualized suspicion, i.e., none, is the same as with a level one
stop. However, since drivers were required to stop
and had no opportunity to decline to participate, the
roadblock stop went well beyond a level one encounter. It did not, however, qualify as a level two or
three stop, since no individualized suspicion prompted the stop.
7. This provision has been characterized as a legislatively enacted version of the so-called level two
stop. See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); note 6 supra.
8. The court's definition of the public interest
pursued, i.e., detection of illegal drug trafficking,
appears to be contrary to testimony about the generalized purposes of the roadblock. There was no
finding as to the actual efficacy of the roadblock in
meeting the public purposes described by the officers or the more specific purposes identified by the
court.
9. While we understand that allowing large trucks to
bypass the roadblock may be necessary for safety's
sake, we wonder about the implications of this
procedure for effective drug interdiction. The procedure seems to invite drug traffickers to transport
their contraband in large trucks, and possibly relatively massive quantities, to avoid detection.
10. Compare United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389
(10th Cir. 1987), upholding the constitutionality of a
roadblock for the purpose of checking driver's licenses, vehicle registration, and insurance, pursuant
only to the permission of a stale police supervisor.
Corral does not cite Brown's requirement, adopted
in Sitz, of a plan explicitly limiting officer discretion. In view of the reiteration of that requirement
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we find in Siu, we do not accept CorraTs implication that supervisory permission to conduct a roadblock constitutes an adequate 'plan. 9
Corral was cited in United States v. McFayden,
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which, in turn, was
relied on by the trial court in holding the roadblock
in this case constitutional. McFayden involved
•traffic control" roadblocks set up to deal with
traffic congestion associated with street level drug
trafficking. The McFayden roadblocks were found
to pass the reasonableness balancing test of Brown.
Those roadblocks, again in contrast to the present
situation, were carried out pursuant to a coordinated plan developed by ri\t District of Columbia
police districts.
11. A similar conclusion might well be reached by
viewing the roadblock as an "administrative search."
Supreme Court cases dealing with such searches
have focused on the balance between the need for
such searches and the fourth amendment values
implicated by such searches. However, the cases also
involved situations where the challenged search was,
at least arguably, authorized by statute or ordinance. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (federal statute); Caroara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)(city
housing code); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967) (city building code).
12. Our uncritical treatment of Siu and other
federal cases should not be taken as approval of the
analysis employed, or result reached, in these cases.
We merely accede to the preeminent position of the
United States Supreme Court in construing the
United States Constitution.
13. Our analysis under the Utah constitution is
limited to the need for legislative authorization. We
note, however, that Justice Durham's opinion in
Larocco, requires both probable cause and exigent
circumstances to justify a warrantless search and
seizure under article I, section 14, which would seem
to prohibit this roadblock and others. However,
Larocco was a divided decision, with Justice Zimmerman concurring, Justice Stewart concurring in
result only, and Justices Hall and Howe dissenting.
The final verdict for Utah roadblocks is, therefore,
unknown.
14. Arguably, legislative enactment of Utah Code
Ann. §§77-7-15 (1990) and 41-l-17(c) (1988)
may reflect a determination by our legislature to not
simply ratify judicial expansion of police power by
silent acquiescence, but to determine through the
political process whether such expansion is to
become a part of Utah's law.
15. Indeed, in the case of port of entry stops, the
legislature appears to have weighed liberty concerns
with some care. Vehicles normally subject to these
stops are exempted from stopping if doing so would
increase their one-way trip distance by more than
three miles or five percent. Utah Code Ann. §2712-19.4 (1) and (3) (Supp. 1990).
16. In Pimental v. Dcp't of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348
(R.I. 1989), and Commonwealth v. Tarberi, 348 Pa.
Super. 306, 502 A.2d 221 (1985), the Rhode Island
Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional
under their state constitutions without considering
whether such practices could be valid if statutorily
authorized.
17. We note that the factors to be considered in
performing such balancing are myriad, complex,
and subject to debate. See, e.g., Sitz and dissenting
opinions of Brennan and Stevens, JJ.; Nelson v.
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